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I. INTRODUCTION
It feels like a moment. I know I'm supposed to analyze this piece from a
purely academic perspective, but first I want to mark the occasion. Guy-Uriel
Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, two of the most astute commentators on
the intersection of election law and civil rights, think it's time to give up on
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), perhaps it's even time to give up
on the civil rights paradigm altogether., When I assigned this paper to my
class, one of the students said that she realized it's time for her to start
mourning the VRA because it's never coming back.
For me, the mourning process began when Shelby County v. Holder came
down.3 But until I'd read The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a
* J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Many thanks to Dan Rauch for as-
always wonderful research assistance.
I. See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The VotingRights Act in Winter:
The Death of a Superstatute, too IOWA L. REV. 1389 (2015).
2. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2o3).
3. As I wrote on the day of the decision:
But for now-for just one moment-a bit of simple mourning is in order. I don't
want to end this column with a punch line or a what-comes-next paragraph. It seems
disrespectful, somehow. People fought and died for this one. It made a difference-




Superstatute,4 I'd been a naive cynic (or a cynical naf). I'd hoped that I wasn't
being hopeful enough. But when the always-wise and ever-optimistic Guy
Charles-the academic who insisted in 2oo6 that the civil rights community
should reject the renewal act and try for better5-tells us that something is
over, it's probably over. When the duo that valiantly tried to lay the
groundwork for rebuilding section 5 tells you it's time to chart a different
course, it's probably time to chart a different course.6
None of this will be easy to hear if you still subscribe to the political
consensus that animated the VRA, if you believe that section 5 was the crown
jewel of the VRA, if you think that we still need an administrative alternative
to costly litigation for race-based voting claims. Now feels like an especially
hard time to hear that we must set aside the race-discrimination model given
how large Ferguson and Garner loom. Which is why it takes a certain kind of
courage to write what Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer have written here. If you
think it's hard to hear these things, just imagine how hard it is to write them,
at least for people who haven't spent their careers playing the studied
contrarian.
Academic articles are strange creatures, and they aren't well suited for
elegies. Yet this feels like one to me. Academics are strange creatures
themselves. Perhaps, then, it's not surprising that an elegy by two scholars
would come in the form this one does: the systematic, clear-eyed, and
relentless documenting of the death of a superstatute. It feels like the
scholarly equivalent of a doctor calling it when the patient's heart has
stopped.
Perhaps because this is an elegy wrapped in a piece of scholarship, some
readers will offer the conventional academic critique and say that there are
really two articles here. The first half of the Article charts the death of a
superstatute,7 and the second imagines a new future for voting rights.8
At first glance, the two subjects seem unrelated. The first half enters into
a conversation (carried on mostly by my colleagues at Yale9) about what Ernie
Heather Gerken, Goodbye to the Crown Jewel of the Civil Rights Movement: People Died to Pass Section 5
of the VotingRights Act, but That Didn't Save It at the Supreme Court, SLATE (June 25, 2013, 3:50 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/j urisprudence/2o13/o6/supremecourtan
d-the voting rights-act goodbyeto-section-5.html.
4. Charles & Fuentes-Rowher, supra note i.
5. Guy Charles, No Deal!, ELECTION L. BLOG (May 15, 2006, 10:2o AM), http://election
lawblog.org/archives/oo562 2.html.
6. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Rethinking Section 5, in THE FUTURE OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 38-60 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2oo6).
7. See Charles & Fuentes-Rowher, supra note i, at 1394-1430.
8. Id. at 143o-38.
9. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
(2014) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
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Young has called "the constitution outside the constitution"lo-those sturdy,
stable programs and principles that constitute our society even if they are not
enshrined in our Constitution's text. The death of a superstatute is an
understudied topic precisely because superstatutes aren't supposed to die.-
The second half of the Article, meanwhile, continues a conversation that the
field of election law had been having ever since the oral argument in Northwest
Austin Municipal District No. One v. Holder ("Northwest Austin") ,12 one that is
more pragmatically focused on identifying a framework for resolving elections
claims. That conversation is not nearly as wide-ranging or theoretically
oriented as the one on superstatutes. Election law scholars, after all, are trying
to come up with a regulatory scheme at the intersection of what Congress can
pass and what the Court can accept, and it may well be a null set. These are
different conversations, and it's no wonder that the two halves of the Article
read so differently.
While I have something to say about each part of the Article, I think the
two pieces are much more closely related than that. To be sure, the effort to
chart the death of a superstatute is interesting standing alone and generates
its own cache of insights, as I note below. But this argument serves a larger
purpose here: It reminds you how much work it takes to maintain a
superstatute in the first place. Those who resist the premise of the second half
of the Article-that it's time to chart a new course-must first grapple with
the truths in the first half of the Article. As the authors show, it was a huge lift
to get three branches of government to work in conjunction with one another
to support section 5.13 For those who think that all we need is a fifth vote on
the Supreme Court to restore section 5 to her old glory, Charles and Fuentes-
Rohwer remind us just how many times the Court and Congress and the
Executive Branch had to bend over backwards not just to keep the old girl
alive, but to maintain section 5 as a vibrant regulatory framework.14 This
analysis will be sobering to those who want to cast Shelby County simply as a
5-4 ruling rather than part of a political sea change. Indeed, the first half of
the Article makes clear just how far these tides have receded. While the two
halves of the Article are quite different, then, they plainly work in tandem and
deepen the authors' argument along almost every dimension. I'll address
each part in turn before turning to the larger themes of the piece.
JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010);
William N. Eskridge,Jr. &John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
10. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 11 7 YALE L.J 408 (2007).
11. Eskridge and Ferejohn, however, have given us an in-depth analysis of "cycles of
constitutional entrenchment and dis-entrenchment." See ESKRIDGE,JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 9,
at 303-430.
12. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).




II. KEEPING A SUPERSTATUTE ALIVE
One of The Voting Rights Act in Winters noteworthy contributions is its
painstaking effort to document how superstatutes are maintained in the first
place. Some-but decidedly not all-of the work on superstatutes tends to
dwell on the triumphalist part of the story. 15 We know a great deal about how
superstatutes are created, but much less about how they are maintained day-
to-day.
What's so engaging about Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer's project is that
they are able to identify how we know a superstatute is "super" after it's been
passed. Much of the work on the "rule of recognition" for constitutional
moments and superstatutes has focused on what precedes passage of the
statute. 6 The authors, in contrast, provide a diagnostic test that can be
applied expost. As they note, if a statute is, indeed, "super," we should see "the
branches view[ing] one another as partners in a joint enterprise" precisely
because the undertaking is both substantial and mandated by a high level of
political consensus.1 7
What makes Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer's analysis particularly arresting
is their juxtaposition of decisions from three institutions-Congress, the
Court, and the Department ofJustice-next to one another. Because we have
mostly taught these materials in their own silos, it's easy to forget the
remarkable amount of teamwork that was necessary to get section 5 off the
ground in the first place. I particularly appreciated the authors' inclusion of
Georgia v. United States" and their analysis of its import.19 Most election law
professors, I suspect, didn't teach Georgia when we taught section 5, and it was
clearly a mistake on our part.
Moreover, it's easy to forget just how big a reach Allen v. State Board of
Electionso was, another truth the Article excavates. We're so accustomed to the
Warren Court's expansive decisions that we forget how "elastically," 1 to use
the authors' euphemism, the Court interpreted the VRA. The authors' use of
earlier judicial decisions on similar questions-Guinn v. United States, Giles v.
15. Eskridge and Ferejohn discuss the post-enactment fate of several superstatutes. See, e.g.,
ESKRIDGE,JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 9, at 135-302. Ackerman discusses the implementation of
the Civil Rights Act and VRA. See generally ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 9.
16. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 9, at 91; Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra
note 9, at 1266, 1275-76.
17. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note i, at 1403.
18. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
19. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note i, at 1407-o8.
20. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
21. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note i, at 1391.
22. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
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Harris,3 the Civil Rights CaseS24-provides an effective contrast here.25 Still,
there are limits to the utility of such comparisons given that these are multi-
member bodies acting in very different periods. The White Primary cases2 6-
Teny v. Adams,27 at least-are also quite "elastic[]" in conceptualizing state
action, but they preceded the passage of the VRA by several decades.2 8
I'm less convinced by the authors' efforts to fold Northwest Austin into
their story, however. It's certainly a novel and imaginative reading, one that
doesn't recycle the same, tired complaints about the case. Maybe Charles and
Fuentes-Rohwer are right to argue that the Justices imagined themselves at
the end of a "chain letter."29 Maybe this is why the Justices felt licensed to
depart from the statutory text in the implausible fashion they did, given the
regularity with which the Court had previously departed from the statutory
text.3o But it's hard not to see Northwest Austin as the beginning of the end, the
clearest sign that the consensus was in the midst of unraveling. Given Northwest
Austin's strong dictum casting doubt on the constitutionality of section 5,31 I
can't see why those who still subscribed to the prior consensus-the Court's
four "liberals"-would sign onto Northwest Austin, save for an act of
desperation. Nor can I see why ChiefJustice Roberts, who clearly believed the
consensus had already unraveled, would have held his fire out of respect for
a chain letter written by the Warren Court in a fashion sure to irk him. Either
the Justices made a deal or the ChiefJustice was engaged in what appears to
be a bit of a pattern for him-sending a shot across Congress's bow before
sinking a statute in a subsequent case.s2
To be sure, my take on Northwest Austin just rehashes the conventional
wisdom. But sometimes views are conventional with good reason. Moreover,
if we are going to compare cases to one another, the departure from the
unambiguous text of the statute in Northwest Austin doesn't seem all that
different from the Court's recent departure from the unambiguous text in
Bond v. United States, a federalism case.33 In both cases, "other considerations
23. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
24. The Civil Rights Cases, 1o9 U.S. 3 (1883).
25. See id. at 1398-1405.
26. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
27. Terry, 345 U.S- 461.
28. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note i, at 1391. Though, to be fair to the authors,
those cases were not accompanied by a similar level of congressional and executive activity.
29. Id. at 1410.
3o. See id. at 1 4 19.
31. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202-04 (2009).
32. See generally, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the
Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181; Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17 GREEN
BAG 2D 173 (2014).
33. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
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trump[ed]"34 the plain text in Roberts's view.3s And, in both cases, one
suspects that those "other considerations" might have included the fact that
the Court was punting on a question it discovered it wasn't ready to answer.3 6
To be fair to Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer, I suppose one could read
Northwest Austin as the Court's own effort to ascertain whether the political
consensus had in fact unraveled. On this view, the Court was inviting Congress
to step in-just as it had stepped in before-to maintain its commitment to
the VRA. Congress's silence on this front, then, was as much of a sign of
dissensus as its inability to do anything but maintain the status quo during the
2oo6 renewal, as the authors so ably demonstrate.37
III. THE WAYFORWARD
However you read Northwest Austin, Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer are
correct to cast Shelby County as an effort to declare an end to the civil rights
consensus.38 While civil rights supporters are likely to balk at that
conclusion-how can a 5-4, hotly contested case declare an end to
anything?-they should at least find the first half of the authors' Article
sobering. It's not hard to imagine one vote on the Supreme Court flipping.
But, as the authors make clear, for the VRA to play the vibrant role section 5
has played in the past, we need a substantial amount of cooperation from
Congress and the Presidency. Congress, of course, seems likely to be paralyzed
in the near future, and it's too soon for anyone to start counting his or her
chickens with regard to the Presidency. It's thus hard to disagree with the
authors' declaration that "[t]he era of cooperation is over."39 They've levied
a powerful challenge here, one that must be addressed by anyone engaged
with these issues going forward.
There's still room for pushback here, however. To be sure, if future civil
rights statutes in the elections arena are to function as superstatutes over many
decades, the authors' claims are sound. It's hard to imagine anything like the
level of inter-branch cooperation we've witnessed in the past on the civil rights
front. But it's not clear to me that that level of cooperation is necessary for
some version of a civil rights statute to succeed. Section 5, after all, spanned
many decades and had to come to grips with a fundamental reordering of the
political sphere. The provision was enacted to ensure that the federal
government could keep up with the ever-changing strategies for
34. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note i, at 1411.
35. In Bond, Roberts seemed to conclude that federalism concerns rendered a clear text
ambiguous. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2o90. For an analysis of the Bond decision, see Bond, 134 S. Ct.
at 2095-97 (Scalia,J., concurring); Heather K Gerken, Slipping the Bonds ofFederalism, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 85, 89-go (2014).
36. Gerken, supra note 35, at 93-94, 112-13.
37. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note i, at 1430-31.
38. See id. at 1 4 22.
39. Id. at 1438.
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discrimination occurring in the covered jurisdictions. The irony, of course, is
that the statutory scheme itself couldn't keep up, which is precisely why we
saw such "elastic[]" efforts to interpret and implement section 5 over time.40
Section 5 had to be a superstatute to succeed during the period in which it
was implemented.
The question is whether a civil rights statute has to be "super" to succeed
in this day and age. While I have trouble imagining another civil rights
superstatute coming along anytime soon, I have less trouble imagining a civil
rights scheme that springs from what Bruce Ackerman would term a period
of "normal politics.">' Regulatory schemes have a funny habit of surviving, in
large part because they become normalized after a few years. I have little
doubt that a civil rights statute would be trimmed by this Court and subject to
inconsistent levels of enforcement, depending on the administration. But if it
were possible to pass a new statute-and that's an enormous "if' in an era in
which Congress is all but sclerotic-it's not clear to me that it would be
destined for failure. The Department of Justice has administered the VRA
under executives of all sorts, and the federal courts include many a judge
willing to apply the law as-is. A new civil rights-oriented statute might limp
along at times, but the game might still be worth the candle. To be sure, the
Roberts Court could at some point decide to decimate all civil rights statutes
by insisting that Congress can regulate only intentional discrimination,
narrowly defined. But that would require a sea change of its own.
Because the authors have oriented their analysis around the superstatute
baseline, however, they don't take into account this possibility. It's clear they
think that the effort to restore section 5 as a superstatute is over, but it's not
clear whether they think the civil rights game would be worth the candle even
in the absence of a political moment powerful enough to pull all three
branches into a civil rights project. I, for one, would be curious as to what they
would say, in large part because I find them to be such thoughtful
commentators on all things elections. That's a discussion for another day,
however.
Whether or not you ultimately agree with the authors' bleak assessment
of the future of the civil rights paradigm, there's much to admire about their
assessment of the alternative paths available to those of us who care about
voting rights. I was particularly struck by the authors' efforts to press on
whether section 5 is really the paradigm we want going forward. Those who
remain nostalgic about the section 5 model will find the authors' counters
bracing. Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer, for instance, insist on knowing "what is
thejustification for protecting voters of color when they are in North Carolina
but not in Pennsylvania" or "[i]n Virginia but not in Wisconsin."42 They
40. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note i, at 1391.
41. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 9, at 3o2.
42. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note i, at 1425.
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wonder why we should be "more disturbed when an African American man is
denied the right to vote in a state because of [a] prior criminal conviction
than when a white woman is denied the same right for the same reason."43
Following on the work of Rick Pildes, Sam Issacharoff, and Rick Hasen,44 they
ask whether partisanship rather than racial discrimination now "best defines
the current voting rights space."45 They mourn the fact that the "substantive
goals of the Reauthorization Act [were] backward-looking and only sought to
restore the status quo ante."46
IV. CONCLUSION: THE SUM OF ITS PARTS
When you lay these seemingly disparate pieces of The Voting Rights Act in
Winter alongside one another, you see not just two independently interesting
lines of analysis, but two arguments that twist around one another and fortify
the argument as a whole. Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer aren't just mapping
the future of voting rights; they are also doing everything they can to show
that we cannot return to a superstatute's past.
These two academics, in short, are determined to move forward, and they
are determined to bring supporters of the civil rights model along with them.
They recognize there is more than one path to take, but they are adamant
that we cannot retrace our steps. When you finish their Article, you will be
haunted by the same question that haunts these authors in their scholarly
elegy to section 5. A new train is a-comin'. Are you ready to get on board?
43- Id. at 1434.
44. Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make
ItHarder to Vote in North Carolina andElsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff,
Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95 (2013); Richard H. Pildes, The
Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 How. L.J. 741 (2006).
45. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note i, at 1426.
46. Id. at 1430.
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